
I am building my company, Q2 Systems, in Detroit at a time when Michigan is making deliberate attempts to reimagine itself as one of America’s serious innovation economies. Specifically this week, I am at the Michigan Tech Week, hosted at Newlab in Detroit – my office for the foreseeable future.
What strikes me most is not simply the language of innovation. Every region in the world now speaks all the language. What has struck me is the machinery behind Michigan’s intentions: economic strategy, workforce planning, startup capital, university linkages, R&D incentives, advanced manufacturing, mobility, AI, and place-based investment all being organized around a coherent state ambition.
Michigan’s “Make It in Michigan” strategy is built around three pillars: projects, people, and places. The state describes the strategy as one designed to win major projects, invest in people from pre-K through postsecondary education, and revitalize places across the state. More recently, Michigan established a $60 million Innovation Fund to support early-stage venture funds, emerging funds, entrepreneurs, founders, and the broader startup ecosystem. It also created an R&D tax credit, allowing larger eligible businesses to claim up to $2 million per year, smaller businesses to claim up to $250,000 per year, and additional credits for collaboration with research universities.
This is not perfect, and no state strategy ever is. But it is serious. It reflects a place trying to connect innovation to industrial inheritance, talent, infrastructure, capital, research, and policy.
From Detroit, I keep thinking about Africa.
If African countries are serious about taking advantage of the Fourth Industrial Revolution [4IR] and the technological shifts now reshaping the global economy, we cannot afford to approach innovation as branding. We need productive strategy. We need clarity. We need discipline. We need to know what we are trying to build, what sectors we intend to win in, what capabilities we must develop, and what institutional machinery is required to sustain those choices beyond one political cycle.
Africa’s opportunity is real, but it is far from automatic.

Delve into Business and International Development with Nthanda Manduwi
After a month of living in the city, I attended a Detroit Economic Growth Corporation event where the City of Detroit was awards 13 businesses with grants amounting to $300,000.
The room was filled with founders, policymakers, and ecosystem builders gathered around a shared objective: increasing the probability that companies are built and sustained here.
I really like how the City of Detroit is approaching their entrepreneurship programming. It is quite deliberate: municipal grants, residency stipends, coworking access, and roles like Director of Entrepreneurship are all designed to reduce friction and create density.
As someone who is both an entrepreneur and a policy analyst, I find myself more than curious. From the inside, the strategy feels coherent. Capital is being deployed, networks are forming, and leadership is aligned around making Detroit competitive for builders.
But the city reveals itself differently once you leave that room. Moving through Detroit with the Director of Youth Affairs, Jerjuan Howard, the layers begin to separate.
Institutional support, ecosystem energy, and neighborhood reality do not fully overlap—they operate in parallel. Jerjuan’s work—through debate programs, public space, and the Howard Family Bookstore—exists at the level where rebuilding becomes physical and immediate.
His question at the end of the day to me,“Do you plan to stay?” left me reflecting on what I hope to gain from and give to Detroit.
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Africa has the demographic opportunity. UNECA estimates that Africa’s working-age population [20–64] will grow from 883 million in 2024 to 1.6 billion by 2050, making up almost a quarter of the global working-age population. It also projects that, by 2050, one in every three young people globally will be African.
Those numbers are powerful, but it is quite flawed to approach this as destiny. A young population becomes a dividend only when it is connected to productive systems: education, health, infrastructure, capital, firms, markets, technology, logistics, and policy continuity. Without those, the demographic dividend can become demographic pressure.
The real question is not merely how many young people Africa has. The question is what those young people are being prepared to build, operate, coordinate, manufacture, maintain, export, and own.
This is why workforce transformation cannot begin at the level of entrepreneurship competitions or business incubators alone. It must begin much earlier. It has to include foundational literacy and numeracy, technical education, vocational excellence, digital skills, systems thinking, engineering exposure, agricultural science, logistics, data literacy, design, manufacturing, and public-sector implementation capacity.
Africa does not only need young people who can use technology. Africa needs young people who can use technology to build productive systems.
The Fourth Industrial Revolution is often discussed in Africa through the language of adoption: AI adoption, blockchain adoption, drone adoption, digital payments adoption, e-commerce adoption, cloud adoption. Adoption is absolutely HUGE, but adoption alone is not transformation.
The African Union has described the 4IR as a watershed moment, highlighting technologies such as AI, robotics, drones, big data, 3D printing, software-enabled industrial platforms, and their implications for sectors including healthcare, agriculture, energy, education, and telecommunications. It also notes that 4IR technologies are expected to create up to $3.7 trillion in value for manufacturing firms globally.
The key word here is value. The question for Africa is not whether these tools exist. The question is whether African economies can use them to create productive value.
That means using AI, simulation, data, IoT, robotics, digital twins, and automation to improve agriculture, agro-processing, logistics, tourism, healthcare supply chains, energy systems, industrial parks, creative industries, and tradeable services. It means moving from digital consumption to production intelligence.
Digital transformation without production transformation will leave Africa as a market, not a maker. I covered this quite extensively in my MSc thesis. We must do both: create AND adopt.
I do not believe Africa’s future should be framed only around old-school smokestack industrialization. In many ways, the more relevant path is what researchers have called “industries without smokestacks.”
Brookings defines industries without smokestacks as sectors that are tradable, have high value added per worker relative to average economy-wide productivity, have capacity for technological change and productivity growth, and can absorb large numbers of moderately skilled workers. Examples include agro-industry, horticulture, tourism, ICT-enabled business services, transport, and logistics.
This framing is important because Africa does not need to copy the exact industrialization path of Britain, America, Japan, Korea, or China. The continent can build productive power through sectors that may not look like traditional manufacturing but behave like manufacturing in the ways that matter: exports, productivity growth, learning, scale, firm capability, and job creation.
An International Growth Centre policy note on Uganda makes this point clearly: industrial policy for productive structural change no longer has to focus only on manufacturing. It can also target tradeable services and agro-industrial activities that share characteristics with manufacturing, including export potential, value addition, medium-skill employment, learning, and productivity growth.
This is exactly where African countries should be paying attention.
Agro-processing is not “soft.” Tourism is not “soft.” Logistics is not “soft.” ICT-enabled services are not “soft.” Creative industries are not “soft.” These sectors require infrastructure, standards, financing, quality control, training, digital systems, market access, and policy coordination. They may not have smokestacks, but they still require industrial discipline.
The danger is that “industries without smokestacks” can be misunderstood as an easier path. It is not easier. It is different.
Agro-processing requires cold chains, packaging, food safety standards, export certification, traceability, warehousing, power, irrigation, and reliable transport. Tourism requires airports, roads, hospitality training, safety, digital payments, destination branding, environmental management, and quality assurance. ICT-enabled services require broadband, cloud infrastructure, data policy, cybersecurity, language skills, and global client acquisition. Logistics requires roads, ports, rail, warehouses, customs reform, fleet systems, route optimization, and regional trade coordination. Creative industries require IP protection, financing, production infrastructure, distribution channels, and professional management.
The IGC policy note argues that countries seeking to develop industries without smokestacks need to improve investment climates, help firms export, and harness agglomeration effects through clusters. It also emphasizes the importance of skills, infrastructure, and enabling institutions.
That is the heart of the matter. These sectors will not scale because we name them. They will scale only if African countries build the systems around them.
Africa does not need endless innovation panels. We have had these for a decade plus now, and they are amounting to close to nothing. We need sector choices, capability maps, financing tools, procurement pathways, infrastructure coordination, skills pipelines, and implementation discipline.
This is where I think Africa’s 4IR conversation must become EXTREMELY precise.
The future is not only digital production. It is predictive production.
By predictive production, I mean the ability to use data, simulation, forecasting, digital twins, AI, sensors, and real-time systems to anticipate what needs to be produced, where, when, by whom, with what inputs, through which infrastructure, and for which markets.
This matters because many African economies are still forced into reactive modes.
We react to food shortages.
We react to import shocks.
We react to currency crises.
We react to broken infrastructure.
We react to energy failures.
We react to medical stockouts.
We react to commodity price movements.
We react to climate shocks.
Predictive production is how countries move from managing scarcity to designing sufficiency.
In manufacturing, digital twins are already being used to simulate real-time factory conditions, run “what-if” analyses, test process or layout changes, and integrate into production scheduling and decision-making. The same logic can apply beyond factories. Agriculture, logistics, energy, water, health supply chains, industrial parks, and ports can all become more intelligent when real-world systems are connected to data, simulation, and operational decision-making.
For Africa, this is a development necessity. This is something we can leverage, and the technologies have advanced enough for us to be able to do so now.
A continent facing climate volatility, food insecurity, infrastructure gaps, rapid urbanization, youth unemployment, and trade dependence cannot afford to plan only after problems appear. We need systems that help us anticipate demand, coordinate supply, reduce waste, protect value, and make better decisions before crisis hits.
The case for industries without smokestacks should not become an excuse to ignore Africa’s weak industrial base. The numbers remain sobering.
UNIDO’s 2025 Africa industrial statistics factsheet reports that, in 2024, Africa accounted for 3.2 percent of global GDP and only 2.0 percent of global manufacturing value added. It also reports that Africa’s manufactured goods exports represented around 1.4 percent of global exports in 2024, while the continent continued to run a persistent manufacturing trade deficit.
UNIDO also notes that Africa’s industrial structure remains concentrated in low-technology sectors, with food products, non-metallic mineral products, and beverages leading in value added. Medium-high and high-technology industries remain a small fraction of output.
This is why the conversation must be sober. Africa should absolutely pursue industries without smokestacks, but we should not confuse that with avoiding production. The point is not to abandon manufacturing. The point is to broaden our understanding of productive capability.
Agriculture can become more industrial. Services can become more export-oriented. Logistics can become more data-driven. Tourism can become more sophisticated. Creative industries can become more commercially structured. Health supply chains can become more resilient. Manufacturing can become more advanced. The common denominator is productive capacity.
Michigan offers a useful case study, not because African countries should copy Michigan, but because Michigan shows what it looks like when a place tries to modernize from its own base.
Michigan is not pretending to be Silicon Valley. It is building from its industrial inheritance: mobility, manufacturing, engineering, design, universities, water, logistics, advanced materials, batteries, semiconductors, and increasingly AI. MEDC describes Michigan’s core sectors as including manufacturing [especially semiconductors, mobility, and advanced air mobility], professional and corporate services, life sciences and medical devices, defense, and aerospace. It also points to the state’s talent advantages, including its concentration of engineers and commercial and industrial designers.
The lesson for Africa is not that every country needs to become Michigan. The lesson is that serious innovation starts from a clear reading of place.
What does a country already have? What does it know how to do? Where are its firms? Where are its universities? Where are its natural advantages? Where are its corridors? Where are its ports? Where are its farmers? Where are its creative clusters? Where are its logistics bottlenecks? Where is demand growing? Where can technology unlock productivity?
Michigan’s AI and Workforce Plan is also instructive. The state estimates that AI could reshape up to 2.8 million jobs in Michigan over the next five to ten years. It also estimates that, with the right strategy, infrastructure, and workforce training, AI could generate up to $70 billion in economic impact and create 130,000 good-paying jobs. The plan is built around skill development, understanding changes to the workforce landscape, and helping businesses adapt to the AI economy.
That is what African countries should study: not the specific numbers, but the posture. Michigan is treating AI as a workforce issue, a business issue, an infrastructure issue, and an economic development issue. Africa should do the same.
I am currently reading Apple in China by Patrick McGee, and it has sharpened how I think about Africa’s position in global production systems.
The book’s core lesson is that China learned through production. Apple’s relationship with Chinese suppliers helped deepen manufacturing capacity, supplier sophistication, logistics, process knowledge, and industrial coordination. Reuters describes the book as an account of how Apple came to depend on Chinese suppliers for most of its products, while Chinese consumers accounted for 17 percent of Apple’s sales last year. It also notes that Apple invested in and taught many local companies how to supply parts for and make its products, contributing to a transfer of manufacturing know-how.
The Washington Post review makes the point even more sharply: Apple was not merely outsourcing manufacturing; it sent engineers, designers, managers, and staff who worked with Chinese counterparts to co-invent production processes. The review notes Tim Cook’s claim that Apple created 5 million jobs in China and argues that Apple’s investments helped nurture China’s future competitors.
This is the lesson Africa should sit with.
Foreign investment is not automatically transformative. It becomes transformative when domestic capability grows. China did not simply host production. It absorbed knowledge, built suppliers, trained workers, developed infrastructure, coordinated logistics, and turned participation in global production into national capability.
African countries must ask a harder question of every foreign partnership: what remains locally after the deal?
Do local firms become suppliers? Do workers acquire transferable skills? Do universities participate? Does the country gain data, IP, technical standards, maintenance capacity, or production know-how? Are local firms moving up the value chain? Are we learning, or are we simply hosting? Are we producing, or are we merely consuming and extracting?
This is also why Howard French’s China’s Second Continent matters. French’s book examines Chinese migration, entrepreneurship, infrastructure activity, and influence across Africa. Penguin Random House describes it as an account of China’s growing presence in Africa and its implications for millions of people, with French traveling through countries including Liberia, Senegal, and Mozambique to examine Chinese entrepreneurs, migrants, and African responses.
The warning is not that Africa should reject China, Asia, or foreign partnership. That would be simplistic and strategically foolish. Africa needs partners. Africa needs trade. Africa needs infrastructure. Africa needs investment. Africa needs technology.
The warning is that Africa must not enter global relationships passively.
China-Africa trade data shows the structural issue clearly. According to Johns Hopkins SAIS-CARI, in 2024 Africa exported a record $99 billion to China while importing $179 billion from China. The largest African exporters to China were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, South Africa, Guinea, and Zambia, primarily because of mineral and oil sales.
That is the pattern Africa must break: raw materials out, finished goods in; resources out, manufactured capability in; commodities out, dependency in.
The issue is not foreign presence itself. The issue is asymmetry. If African countries lack policy clarity, bargaining discipline, industrial strategy, and domestic capability, we risk becoming markets, mines, corridors, data sources, and geopolitical terrain for other people’s ambitions.
Africa does not need to fear foreign partnership. Africa needs to fear entering foreign partnership without a production strategy.
The African Continental Free Trade Area [AfCFTA] is one of the most important policy opportunities on the continent, but it cannot remain a trade slogan.
The World Bank estimated that, if fully implemented, AfCFTA could raise regional income by 7 percent, or $450 billion, and lift 30 million people out of extreme poverty by 2035. It also emphasized that many of the gains would come from trade facilitation: reducing red tape, simplifying customs procedures, lowering compliance costs, and helping African businesses integrate into supply chains.
That means AfCFTA is not just about moving goods across borders. It is about building regional production systems.
African countries need to think in terms of regional value chains: where inputs come from, where processing happens, where packaging happens, where logistics hubs sit, where standards are harmonized, where digital systems interoperate, where workers are trained, where financing flows, and where final markets are located.
A continent-wide market only becomes powerful when it is matched with continent-wide productive coordination.
African countries do not need to do everything. In fact, trying to do everything is part of the problem. Serious strategy requires choosing.
A country might choose horticulture, tourism, logistics, and digital business services. Another might choose agro-processing, pharmaceuticals, and creative industries. Another might choose ports, maritime logistics, energy systems, and industrial parks. Another might choose education technology, health supply chains, and business process outsourcing.
The point is not that every country should choose the same sectors. The point is that each country needs a disciplined answer to the question: where can we build productive advantage?
Once that answer is clear, policy can organize around it. Education can align. TVET can align. Universities can align. Infrastructure can align. Procurement can align. Tax incentives can align. Development finance can align. Foreign investment negotiations can align. Startup ecosystems can align.
This is the lesson I keep returning to from Michigan. Policy clarity tells capital, talent, firms, universities, and public institutions where to aim.
Africa’s problem is not a lack of ideas. Africa’s problem is often a lack of continuity, coordination, and execution.
Africa’s future workforce cannot only be digitally literate. It must be production literate.
That means young Africans must understand how real systems work: how food moves from farm to market; how inputs become outputs; how logistics networks function; how quality standards are met; how machines are maintained; how data informs decisions; how exports are certified; how energy affects production; how infrastructure shapes competitiveness; how firms scale; how public policy affects markets.
The future African workforce includes software developers, yes. But it also includes agronomists, machinists, robotics technicians, logistics planners, simulation designers, AI specialists, industrial engineers, product managers, cold-chain operators, food scientists, designers, port managers, electricians, data analysts, construction technologists, public procurement specialists, and industrial policy thinkers.
This is why early education matters. A country cannot suddenly create a production-oriented workforce at age 22. The pipeline must begin with how children are taught to solve problems, understand systems, use tools, work with their hands, reason quantitatively, and connect knowledge to real life.
The Fourth Industrial Revolution will not wait for Africa to organize itself.
Other countries and companies are already positioning themselves around AI, data, minerals, energy, robotics, manufacturing, food systems, logistics, and supply chains. The question is whether Africa will enter this era as a consumer, a supplier of raw materials, a youthful labor pool, and a market for other people’s technologies, or whether African countries will become builders of the systems that define the future.
The answer will not come from speeches about innovation. It will come from production strategy.
Africa needs industries without smokestacks, absolutely. But those industries need infrastructure, skills, financing, standards, data systems, export discipline, and industrial policy. Africa needs foreign partners, absolutely. But those partnerships must build domestic capability. Africa needs digital transformation, absolutely. But digital transformation must be connected to agriculture, logistics, health, energy, tourism, manufacturing, creative industries, and real economic systems.
Africa has the demographic scale.
It has the urgency.
It has the resources.
It has the markets.
It has the creative capacity.
What Africa needs now is policy clarity and laser focus.
We need to more than just consume technology. We must use technology to produce, predict, coordinate, export, and own.
If you’d like to go deeper into my journey — from Malawi, through the United Nations to Microsoft, you can find it in my books.
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